Previous work has shown that people often underestimate their task-completion times (Buehler, Grin, & Ross, 1994) . The present research examined whether this optimistic bias may be reduced through the formation of implementation intentions. In an experimental study, participants were requested to complete an assignment within a speci®ed time period. Half of these participants made implementation intentions about where and when they would complete the assignment. The remaining participants were simply given the goal of completing the assignment. The results showed that furnishing participants' goals with implementation intentions led to (a) more optimistic completion predictions, (b) an even greater increase in actual rates of goal completion, and, consequently, (c) a signi®cant reduction in optimistic bias in completion predictions. Furthermore, the reduction in optimistic bias among implementation±intention participants was found to be mediated by a smaller number of interruptions while working on the assignment. Together, these ®ndings attest to the importance of implementation planning in overcoming unrealistic optimism in task-completion predictions.
reasoning also extends to the task of generating completion predictions. Accordingly, people's wishes and desires may aect their tendency to engage in scenario thinking, thereby producing a change in their level of optimistic bias.
A recent experiment by Buehler, Grin, and MacDonald (1997) investigated the role of motivated reasoning in making completion predictions. The results showed that participants who had received a speed incentive displayed greater optimistic bias in their completion predictions relative to participants without such an incentive. Supplemental thought-listing protocols revealed that speed incentives caused participants to focus more narrowly on their plans for the upcoming task at the expense of the consideration of past experience. Interestingly, participants who were provided with an accuracy incentive displayed a marginally signi®cant tendency to overestimate their actual completion times, suggesting that these participants tended to err in a pessimistic direction. Taken together, these ®ndings indicate that motivated reasoning can exert a powerful in¯uence on the degree of optimistic bias, in particular by aecting people's propensity to engage in scenario thinking.
Taken at face value, Buehler et al.'s (1997) ®ndings would seem to oer a convenient way towards eliminating the planning fallacy. By substituting speed incentives for incentives to make accurate predictions, it may be possible to do away with optimistic bias for good. Unfortunately, this strategy may be accompanied by considerable motivational costs. As it turns out, optimistic expectancies can promote actual task performance, even when those expectancies turn out to be unrealistic (Buehler, MacDonald, & Grin 1994 , cited in Buehler et al., 1995 . Tempering people's optimism may therefore frequently be ill-advised, because doing so may undermine people's subsequent motivation and performance. Thus, it would appear that a certain amount of optimistic bias in completion predictions is often inevitable.
FROM GOAL SETTING TO GOAL STRIVING: THE VOLITIONAL BENEFITS OF PLANNING
Or is it? Suppose if people could increase the eectiveness of their goal pursuits to such a degree that even their highly optimistic goals could be met. If that were possible, people could retain their optimistic outlooks without making excessive commitments. Although this may sound too good to be true, there may actually exist a mental strategy that is capable of suciently boosting the eectiveness of people's goal pursuits.
To understand how this can occur, we need to consider in more detail how the process of planning mentally prepares the individual for future action (Gollwitzer, 1990 (Gollwitzer, , 1993 (Gollwitzer, , 1996 (Gollwitzer, , 1999 Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998) . Drawing from notions in classic German will psychology (Ach, 1910) , Heckhausen (1991) and Gollwitzer (1993) proposed that planning consists of two successive stages, goal setting and goal striving. The speci®c tasks addressed in each stage are further assumed to activate dierent cognitive procedures or`mindsets' (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987) . During the stage of goal setting, the individual presumably acquires a deliberative mindset, i.e. an orientation towards an accurate analysis of feasibility-related information. During the subsequent stage of goal striving, the individual presumably acquires an implemental mindset, i.e. an
Overcoming the planning fallacy 875 orientation towards a self-serving, optimistic analysis of information. Relevant research has produced support for the hypothesized qualitative dierences between deliberative and implemental mindsets (Beckmann & Gollwitzer, 1987; Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Gollwitzer et al., 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 1987; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . Most relevant here, recent research by Armor and Taylor  (discussed in Armor & Taylor, 1998, unpublished manuscript) has shown that optimistic bias in completion predictions becomes increased when people have an implemental mindset, and decreased when they have a deliberative mindset. Although the above-mentioned research suggests that contemplating the implementation of one's goals mainly serves to increase the planning fallacy, it should be kept in mind that this research mainly addressed the eects of cognitive mindset. Implemental mindsets are ultimately geared towards facilitating action implementation, but they are primarily directed towards people's cognitive functioning (Gollwitzer, 1996) . To maximize the action-facilitating eects of planning, additional volitional strategies may be required (Gollwitzer, 1999) . Speci®cally, people may furnish their goal intentions, or commitments to particular goals, with implementation intentions, concrete action plans that specify when, where, and how, to act. Laboratory experiments have shown that implementation intentions cause the mental representation of the anticipated situation to become highly activated and thus easily accessible (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Steller, 1992 , discussed in Gollwitzer, 1999 . Furthermore, the formation of implementation intentions serves to automatize action initiation (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Gollwitzer & BrandstaÈ tter, 1997; Malzacher, 1992 , discussed in Gollwitzer, 1999 . Implementation intentions can also be useful after action initiation has taken place, by helping people to ward o distractions stemming from alternative goal pursuits (Patterson & Mischel, 1976; Schaal & Gollwitzer, 1999 , discussed in Gollwitzer, 1999 .
Research has further shown that implementation intentions can exert strong eects on behavior outside of the laboratory. In one study, Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) found that the formation of implementation intentions helped participants to complete an assignment during their Christmas break within a ®xed deadline. Similar ®ndings have been obtained in other research, indicating that implementation intentions are helpful in promoting a variety of health-promotion and diseaseprevention behaviors, such as performing breast self-examinations (Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997) , regular intake of a vitamin supplement (Sheeran & Orbell, 1999) , and eating healthy foods (Verplanken & Faes, 1999) . Taken together, these ®ndings suggest that implementation intentions constitute a powerful self-regulatory tool that serves to bring people's actions in line with their goals (Gollwitzer, 1999) . As such, it seems conceivable that the formation of implementation intentions can help to reduce the planning fallacy.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
The foregoing discussed two powerful lines of research that are especially relevant to the understanding of optimistic planning. The ®rst has focused on cognitive and motivational determinants of optimism in speci®c task-completion predictions (Buehler et al., 1994 (Buehler et al., , 1997 . The second line of research has predominantly focused on volitional determinants of global optimism and goal-completion rates (Gollwitzer & BrandstaÈ tter, 1997; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . Importantly, these two lines of research have recently been synthesized in a set of studies showing how deliberative versus implemental mindsets aect task-speci®c optimism and completion rates (see Armor & Taylor, 1997) . In the present research, we sought to expand on this new synthesis by examining the utility of implementation intentions in reducing unrealistic optimism in speci®c task-completion predictions.
1 This extension is theoretically important because the volitional bene®ts of planning should be at a maximum when the individual has engaged in implementation planning that is directly relevant to the task at hand. Thus, previous research may have underestimated the potential of implementation planning in combatting optimistic bias in task-completion predictions.
To address these issues, we adapted the report assignment paradigm developed by Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) . Following this paradigm, we gave our participants the assignment to write a report concerning a particular day in the near future. As in Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) , one half of the participants were requested to form implementation intentions regarding where and when to write the report. The remaining participants were simply requested to write the report. Immediately following this manipulation, participants were asked to predict their rates of completing the assignment. Participants then recorded their actual initiation and completion rates for working on the assignment.
In light of previous ®ndings that contemplating the implementation of one's goals fosters an optimistic mindset (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) , we predicted that implementation±intention participants would be more optimistic in their completion predictions than control participants. In addition, we predicted that forming an implementation intention would result in an actual increase of participants' rates of goal completion. Third, and most important, we hypothesized that the eects of implementation intentions would be greater for actual than for predicted behavior. This hypothesis was based on previous ®ndings that behavioral eects of implementation intentions are particularly strong (cf. Gollwitzer, 1999) . Accordingly, implementation±intention participants were expected to display less optimistic bias in their forecasting than control participants.
Besides the above-mentioned hypotheses, the present research also addressed some of the behavioral mechanisms that may mediate the in¯uence of implementation planning. First, previous work by Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) indicates that implementation intentions may be especially helpful in the service of initiating goaldirected behavior. To assess whether the formation of implementation intentions had a dierential impact on task initiation and task completion, we obtained separate assessments of predicted and actual rates of task initiation and task completion. Second, we explored the potential shielding function of implementation planning. According to Buehler et al. (1995) , goal interruptions constitute an important source 1 It is important to note that our predictions were only concerned with directional (optimistic) bias in prediction. Correspondence between predictions and actual completion times can also be assessed at the correlational level. This correlational form of predictive accuracy needs to be distinguished from directional bias both theoretically and empirically (Buehler et al., 1994; see also Funder & Colvin, 1997) . However, in keeping with previous research on the planning fallacy (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Buehler et al., 1994 Buehler et al., , 1997 , we were primarily interested in the determinants of directional bias.
Overcoming the planning fallacy 877 of optimistic bias in completion predictions, because people generally fail to incorporate such distractions into their plan-based scenarios. As Gollwitzer (1999) have shown, forming implementation intentions can be especially helpful in warding o distractions stemming from alternative goal pursuits. Thus, implementation intentions may help to reduce optimistic bias in completion predictions by reducing the number of interruptions during the execution of the goal. To explore this possibility, we assessed the number of interruptions during task completion (i.e. writing the report), and investigated whether reductions in optimistic bias due to forming implementation intentions were mediated by corresponding reductions in the number of interruptions.
METHOD Participants and Design
One hundred and twenty undergraduate students (28 men and 92 women, average age 22 years) from the University of Nijmegen were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions (goal intention or implementation intention). As soon as participants' reports were returned to the laboratory, participants were paid D¯. 7,50 (approximately US$4) for their participation. Overall, 80 participants (i.e. 67% of the original sample) returned their report within the assigned period. The return rate was virtually equal between the two experimental conditions (39 versus 41). Empirically, this null ®nding corroborates Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997, Experiment 2) , who similarly failed to ®nd an eect on return rates (in fact, return rates in their experiment were slightly higher in the goal-intention condition than in the implementation±intention condition). Although the absence of an eect of implementation planning on return rates may seem at odds with the current hypotheses, this ®nding actually agrees with the line of thinking that inspired the present research. Theoretically, return rates represent a motivational variable, given that they involve the issue`Shall I engage in this task or not?'. Thus, given that implementation planning represents a volitional manipulation, its lack of eects on return rates is not surprising. Instead, eects of implementation planning should only emerge on goal-completion rates, which represent a volitional variable because they involve the how and when of goal pursuits. As such, the lack of eects on return rates, in conjunction with the ®ndings for goal-completion rates (see the Results section), support the usefulness of discriminating between motivational and volitional variables.
Procedure
During a two-week period, participants were recruited at the psychology department in Nijmegen. Upon their arrival in the laboratory, participants were seated in individual cubicles, where they received a written instruction. The ®rst part of the instruction was identical for both conditions. It was explained that the study was concerned with how students spend their leisure time. Participants were told that they were to write a lively report of their experiences during a speci®c day of their lives. This day was to be chosen by participants themselves, but had to fall within an assigned period of one week. This was always one week after the instruction was given. It was explained that memories of experiences during leisure time fade rather quickly so that it was important to write the report as quickly as possible after the day of the report. Preferably, the report was to be written within one day after the report day had passed. The report itself was to be returned within two weeks after the assigned week had passed. Instructions further stressed that participants would remain anonymous. Anonymity was secured by a speci®c coding scheme that required participants to create their own code number from three letters and a digit (i.e. ®rst letter of mother's ®rst name, of her maiden name, and of their own place of birth).
After the assignment was explained to them, participants were asked to predict on which day they would start writing the report and on which they thought they would be ®nished writing it. Participants were told to write their predictions on the instruction sheet. At this point, instructions started to dier between conditions. Following the procedure outlined by Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) , participants in the implementation±intention condition were asked to make the same predictions, but were also asked to specify when and where they intended to write their report. They picked a speci®c point in time (e.g. right after breakfast the next morning) and a certain place (e.g. in a quiet corner in the living room) for starting to write. Moreover, they were asked to visualize the chosen situation and to commit themselves to seize it by silently saying`I intend to write the report in situation x'. In addition, participants were requested to record their choices of time and place on the instruction sheet. Goal-intention participants did not go through this part of the procedure.
After participants handed the instruction sheets to the experimenter, they were supplied with a prepared form on which they were to write the report. Participants were requested to write down their personal code and to record every occasion and the times (date, hour, and minute; from beginning to end) when they had been working on the report. They also received a stamped envelope carrying the address of the social psychology department. In a short oral instruction, the experimenter repeated that participants should write as valid a report as possible using no more than two pages (the form consisted of two pages only). All participants were asked to send the ®nished reports back as soon as possible.
Finally, participants were asked to put their personal codes and bank account numbers on a separate form. It was explained that we would need this information in order to deposit their participation fees to their bank accounts after we had received their completed assignments. This form was kept separately from the instruction sheets and it was stressed that all the data were con®dential and that there was no way to identify the participants. Two weeks after the last assigned period had passed, the promised fees were transferred to the participants who had returned their reports. 2 2 Due to an administrative error, the postmarks on participants' return envelopes were not stamped. Consequently, it was not possible to check the dates of returning the assignment on the postmarks. Fortunately, the results by Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) have shown that in the present paradigm, there exists very high convergence between objective completion times and those reported by the participants themselves.
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RESULTS

Treatment of the Data
On average, participants reported spending 45 uninterrupted minutes writing the report. These self-reported uninterrupted writing times did not dier between conditions, F 5 1.5. This nonsigni®cant result is meaningful, because it reduces the suspicion that participants in the implementation±intention condition were simply less thorough in their ful®llment of the experimental assignment than participants in the goal-intention condition. Task-initiation times were computed relative to the chosen report days. Thus, an initiation time of 1 indicates that a participant reported that he or she began working on the report one day after the chosen report day had gone by. Similarly, the days on which participants ®nished the report (to be called: completion times) were corrected for the initiation date by subtracting the initiation dates from the completion dates. Thus, a task-completion time of 1 indicates that a participant reported having ®nished the report one day after he or she started working on it.
Actual and Predicted Task-completion Times
Predicted and actual rates of goal completion were subjected to a 2 (condition: implementation intention or goal intention) Â 2 (action phase: initiation or completion) Â 2 (type of measure: prediction or behavior) mixed-model ANOVA, with repeated measures on the second and third factors. This analysis revealed a signi®cant eect of action phase, F(1,78) 4.06, p 5 0.05, which indicated that predicted and actual initiation times were longer than predicted and actual completion times (M 1.03 versus M 0.57). Because the action phase factor did not interact with the other factors, it was dropped from the analyses reported here. We refer to initiation and completion times together as`rates of goal completion'. Relevant means are displayed in Table 1 .
The analysis further showed a main eect of type of measure, F(1,78) 8.17, p 5 0.006, indicating that, on average, predicted rates of goal completion were faster than actual rates of goal completion (M 1.25 versus M 1.94). In addition, a main eect was found for condition, F(1,78) 11.14, p 5 0.002. Separate analyses revealed that participants in the implementation intention predicted faster rates of goal completion than participants in the goal-intention condition, F(1,78) 5.32, p 5 0.03 (M 0.85 versus M 1.67). In addition, actual rates of goal completion were signi®cantly faster in the implementation intention than in the goal-intention condition, F(1,78) 10.97, p 5 0.002 (M 1.02 versus M 2.90).
Importantly, the expected interaction between condition and type of measure was obtained, F(1,78) 4.67, p 5 0.04. Further analyses showed that unrealistic In the goal-intention condition, participants were clearly unrealistically optimistic about their rates of goal completion, F(1,38) 6.29, p 5 0.02. In short, the formation of implementation intentions led to an important reduction in unrealistic optimism regarding the rates of goal completion.
Absolute Accuracy
Although our main interest was in investigating directional optimistic bias, correspondence between predicted and actual completion times can also be assessed at the correlational level. This correlational index is sometimes referred to as thè absolute accuracy' of predictions (Buehler et al., 1994) . Overall absolute accuracy was high and statistically reliable, r 0.55, p 5 0.001. This correlation is comparable to that found in similar research (e.g. Buehler et al., 1994) . Furthermore, this correlation was not found to vary between the experimental conditions. This ®nding is consistent with other research showing that directional bias and absolute accuracy are both empirically and theoretically distinct (Buehler et al., 1994 (Buehler et al., , 1995 see also Funder & Colvin, 1997) . One explanation for the lack of eects on absolute accuracy may be that implementation planning exerts to a large degree parallel eects on predictions and behavior, so that it may leave the relation between predictions and behavior essentially intact. Another explanation may be that, even in the control condition, the correlation between predictions and behavior was fairly high. Indeed, a recent review (Armor & Taylor, 1998) showed that, despite the existence of a pervasive optimistic bias, people's speci®c predictions are not indiscriminantly optimistic: they tend to obey the constraints of reality. Given people's apparent sensitivity to the demands of the situation at the correlational level, it may have been dicult for implementation intentions to produce gains in absolute accuracy.
Number of Interruptions
Recall that we had previously hypothesized that implementation intentions might cause a reduction in unrealistic optimism because they can shield ongoing goal pursuits against interruptions. To examine this possibility, we analyzed the number of interruptions during the writing of the assignment. Using participants' self-reports, we used the number of entries participants had listed to count the number of times they were interrupted while working on the assignment. Number of interruptions was then submitted to a oneway between-subjects ANOVA (condition: implementation intention or goal intention). As expected, participants in the implementation± intention conditions reported fewer interruptions than participants in the goalintention condition, F(1,78) 4.09, p 5 0.05 (M 0.29 versus M 0.62).
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Mediation Analysis
To qualify as a potential mediator, the number of interruptions must not only bear a signi®cant relationship to unrealistic optimism. It must also eliminate or greatly diminish the eect of making implementation intentions on unrealistic optimism, when both number of interruptions and condition are entered into the analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . To test for mediation, we conducted a series of separate path analyses (see Figure 1) . First, the direct relationship between implementation planning and unrealistic optimism was signi®cant, b À 0.24, t(1,78) À 2.13, p 5 0.04. Second, implementation planning was predictive of the number of interruptions, b À 0.22, t(1,78) À 2.02, p 5 0.05. Third, when implementation planning and number of interruptions were entered into the equation simultaneously, the number of interruptions was predictive of unrealistic optimism, b 0.41, t(1,78) 3.98, p 5 0.001. Moreover, the direct relationship between implementation planning and unrealistic optimism became smaller and no longer signi®cant, b À 0.15, t(1,78) À 1.41, p 0.163. Although the number of interruptions was found to mediate the eect of implementation intentions on the overall rate of goal completion, this mediation eect should logically be restricted to completion times. This is because interruptions while working on the assignment occurred by de®nition only after participants had initiated the experimental task. Consistent with this, the number of interruptions was signi®cantly correlated with optimistic bias in completion predictions, r (80) À 0.54, p 5 0.001, but not with optimistic bias in initiation predictions, r (80) À 0.12, p 0.31. Thus, in line with expectations, the obtained decrease in the number of interruptions only mediated a reduction in optimistic bias in completion predictions, not in initiation predictions. 
DISCUSSION
People display a ubiquitous tendency to underestimate their task-completion times (Buehler et al., 1994 (Buehler et al., , 1995 . Previously, researchers have sought to reduce this socalled planning fallacy by leading people to temper their lofty expectations (e.g. Buehler et al., 1994 Buehler et al., , 1997 . Implicit in this approach is the notion that it is generally easier to moderate one's optimism than it is to dramatically improve the eciency of one's goal pursuits. As the current ®ndings show, the eects of forming implementation intentions defy this logic. On the one hand, the formation of implementation intentions led to increased optimism in completion predictions. This con®rms earlier ®ndings that re¯ecting on the implementation of one's actions makes people more optimistic (Armor & Taylor, 1997; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) . On the other hand, however, this increase in optimism was exceeded by an increase in actual rates of goal completion due to forming implementation intentions. The net result of forming implementation intentions was therefore a reduction in unfounded optimism. Thus, the present research provides the ®rst unequivocal demonstration that the formation of implementation plans can be an eective aide in attacking optimistic bias in task-completion predictions.
Given that implementation intentions were found to have a powerful in¯uence on thought and action, it is important to identify the processes through which implementation intentions may become eective. At ®rst glance, the formation of implementation intentions may seem very similar to Buehler et al.'s (1994 Buehler et al.'s ( , 1995 description of scenario thinking. Indeed, while forming implementation intentions, people are focusing on the future and imagine where and when they intend to work on a given project (e.g. Gollwitzer & BrandstaÈ tter, 1997) . However, the formation of implementation intentions also includes aspects that are probably absent in spontaneously occurring scenario thinking. In particular, the formation of implementation intentions explicitly requires that people visualize the situation in which a particular behavior will be enacted. Thus, vivid imagination of an intended action may constitute an important ingredient of implementation planning (see also Taylor & Pham, 1996) . Moreover, the formation of implementation intentions explicitly recruits people's will power, by asking them to commit themselves to the intended behavior. Prior research has shown that such willful commitment greatly enhances the eectiveness of implementation intentions (Seehausen, Bayer, & Gollwitzer, 1994; Steller, 1992; both discussed in Gollwitzer, 1996) .
The present ®ndings also oer further insight into the behavioral mechanisms that may mediate the eectiveness of implementation planning. Following Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) , we suspected that implementation intentions might be particularly helpful to get started. Contrary to this, however, implementation intentions were found to be equally eective in both the stage of action initiation and the stage of action completion. It thus appears that our ®ndings cannot be fully explained by the initiation-facilitating eects of implementation intentions. How else could implementation intentions have improved the eciency of action completion? One informative result is that implementation intentions led to a smaller number of interruptions during action execution. Further analyses showed that the number of interruptions statistically mediated the eects of implementation intentions on Overcoming the planning fallacy 883 optimistic bias, suggesting that variations in the number of interruptions were able to explain why implementation intentions led to a reduction in optimistic bias. These interruption ®ndings illuminate several important aspects of optimistic bias in completion predictions. We obtained a strong relation between the number of interruptions and optimistic bias, suggesting that optimistic bias arises when people fail to take interruptions of their goal pursuits into account. This is consistent with Buehler et al.'s (1995) theorizing that scenario thinking often leads people to neglect potential impediments during task completion. It further appears that implementation planning promotes more eective shielding against such unexpected interruptions, thus removing this source of bias from people's predictions. Possibly, the shielding function of implementation intentions is established during the stage of action preparation, when people mentally seek out environments where task completion will not be disturbed.
3 Alternatively, the shielding function may be re¯ective of a cognitive inhibition of distracting stimuli (Gollwitzer, 1991; Schaal & Gollwitzer, 1999 , both discussed in Gollwitzer, 1999 . Further research is needed to determine which of these possible mechanisms is responsible for reducing the number of interruptions during goal pursuit.
In a way, the present ®ndings indicate that implementation planning may allow people to have their cake and eat it too: they can retain their optimistic outlooks without running the risk of making excessive commitments. Nevertheless, we do not mean to suggest that there are no limits to the bene®ts of implementation planning. First and foremost, implementation planning only helps when people have chosen reasonable goals (Gollwitzer & Schaal, 1998) . Thus, even the most eective implementation planning will be of little help to individuals suering from delusions of grandeur. The latter group of individuals is probably better o by adjusting their aspirations to more realistic levels. As such, the eectiveness of implementation planning may be dependent on the development of sucient meta-cognitive abilities to recognize one's own (in)competence (cf. Kruger & Dunning, 1999) . Second, forming implementation intentions is only likely to be eective when people have sucient commitment to their goals (Orbell et al., 1997; cf. Gollwitzer, 1999) . Third, forming implementation intentions to execute a speci®c behavior may reduce a person's¯exibility to engage suitable alternatives (Gollwitzer, 1999) . This may be harmful under rapidly changing conditions, when there is insucient time to shift one's commitments. Finally, people's energy resources to engage in willful planning may be limited (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; . A more precise speci®cation of the parameters that limit the eectiveness of implementation planning provides an important agenda for future research.
Before closing, it is important to note some potential limitations of the present research. First, the present research relied on self-reporting to assess actual behavior.
Thus, a critic might argue that the obtained eects of implementation intentions could be due to social desirability. For several reasons, we believe that this is unlikely. First, we took several precautions to minimize social desirability pressures, making it clear to participants that their responses would remain anonymous. Moreover, the main purpose of the investigation, i.e. examination of optimistic bias, was not revealed to our participants through the use of a cover story. Both of these precautions can be expected to reduce the likelihood that concerns with selfpresentation motivated our participants to con®rm the experimenter's hypotheses. Finally, the present ®ndings closely parallel other ®ndings in the literature, most notably those obtained by Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) . In a highly similar paradigm, Gollwitzer and BrandstaÈ tter (1997) found no dierences between completion dates reported by their participants and objective-completion dates. Likewise, other research using objective behavioral measures has found that selfreports of behavior are equally trustworthy for participants who have formed implementation intentions and those who have not (e.g. Sheeran & Orbell, 1999) .
Overall, it appears that the obtained eects of implementation intentions cannot be explained by tendencies to engage in socially desirable reporting.
A second potential limitation is that the present research only examined one indicator of successful goal pursuit, i.e. rates of completing a written assignment. In a recent review, Armor and Taylor (1998) persuasively argued that optimistic expectancies are often highly situated: optimistic expectancies tend to be expressed more or less depending on the demands of the situation and the immediate needs of the individual. Thus, the factors that in¯uence optimistic bias in completion predictions are not necessarily the same as the factors that in¯uence optimistic bias in predictions for other task outcomes. Given that other research has found implementation intentions to be eective across a wide variety of behavioral domains (cf. Gollwitzer, 1999) , there are grounds for believing that the current ®ndings are generalizable to other settings. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to replicate the current ®ndings using alternative measures of successful goal completion.
CODA
Throughout history, scholars have been skeptical about the causal status of the will. Even long before the days of Ach (1910) , Hume (1739 Hume ( /1888 see Wegner & Wheatly, 1999) argued that the will is`nothing but the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind ' ( p. 399) . Although the role of the will in action control continues to be controversial in the present day and age Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) , recent years have witnessed an accumulation of cognitive Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) , motivational (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996) , and neurological (Kuhl, 1994; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) ®ndings linking willful experience to action. The present work adds to this growing body of research that certain forms of willing, i.e. implementation planning, may be especially helpful in overcoming excessive optimism. Willful processes may thus serve a crucial function in connecting thought to action. As such, it seems worth while to keep the will alive in psychological theorizing.
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